Abstract. The recent proliferation of facility-siting conflicts underscores the need for new analytical techniques in which the external effects associated with noxious facilities are considered explicitly. In general, in prescriptive facility-location models it is assumed that having populations "closer", as characterized by transport or accessibility advantages, is better for desirable facilities, but, locating "farther" away is better for undesirable facilities. The modeling formulation developed in this paper adds two new concepts to the prescriptive modeling work on locating noxious facilities: (1) "complementary anticover" as a measure of equity for siting facilities that provide a required capacity for producing goods or services, and (2) perceived risk attributable to the scale of these facilities. These two concepts, in conjunction with conventional cost considerations, are used to develop a multiobjective location model that may be used to find locational patterns which mitigate public opposition across a broad range of noxious facilities.
Introduction
Conflicts involving the location of noxious facilities show no signs of abating, despite the proliferation of state initiatives to improve the siting process (EPA, 1980; Gladwin, 1980; Morell and Majorian, 1982) . Early conceptual models of the roots and resolution of such conflicts (Austin et al, 1970; Mumphrey et al, 1971; Mumphrey and Wolpert, 1973; O'Hare, 1977; Wolpert, 1976) relied primarily on economic and group behavioral assumptions. These models have been supplemented with a growing body of literature on risk communication and risk perception (Fischhoff, 1985; Kasperson, 1986b; Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 1986; Schwing and Albers, 1980; Slovic et al, 1979; and on approaches to aligning disputeresolution strategies with such perceptions (Lake, 1986; Sorenson et al, 1984) . Nevertheless, the persistence and intensity of facility-siting controversies suggest that advances in explanatory models have yet to be translated into prescriptive approaches which fully illuminate trade-offs among measures of public opposition, equity, and efficiency in facility-siting decisionmaking.
In this paper, we focus on the interplay of facility scale and risk sharing to develop a prescriptive location-model structure for use in elucidating such trade-offs and in prescribing alternative resolutions to siting controversies surrounding noxious facilities. The essence of our argument may be stated as follows. Within a given region in which a predetermined service or production capacity is needed, hazardous facilities-nuclear plants, chemical plants, chemical waste treatment-plants, radioactive waste repositories-pose site-specific risks. These risks bear a direct relationship to the scale of the facility and to public opposition to siting. As scale increases, public perceptions enlarge risks, and opposition to siting tends to intensify (Wilbanks, 1986) . This uneasiness with bigness seems to stem from a multitude of interrelated factors, including, for example, the complexity of managing large capitalintensive hazardous facilities (Perrow, 1984) ; the consequences of catastrophic events despite their extremely low probabilities of occurrence (Popper, 1983) ; and the necessity of transporting hazardous materials long distances to centralized locations at which risks become concentrated (Carnes, 1986) .
Another public response linked to scale is the adverse response of a host community to its designation as the exclusive site in a region for a noxious facility. This response is precipitated by a sense of inequity that accompanies such a singular designation and by the violation of a fundamental principle of equity that arises when one group is compelled to bear a disproportionate fraction of the risks for the benefit of a regional population (Kasperson, 1983) . The interplay of risk sharing and scale opposition within the framework of meeting exogenously defined regional capacity requirements forms the basis for the prescriptive location model developed in this paper.
In the following section, we elaborate a rationale for specifying facility scale and risk sharing as pivotal determinants of public opposition to noxious facilities. We then provide a formulation of the 'complementary anticover' methodology in which these two concepts are incorporated within a prescriptive modeling framework to yield a set of solutions and trade-offs for locating a regional system of facilities. Our model is employed in a hypothetical case study in which a range of facility sizes and sites are specified and, from these, a set of solutions are derived that illustrate the trade-offs among cost per unit capacity, total population placed at-risk, aggregate opposition, and opposition per facility. In the final section we explain the versatility and future applications of the model in the context of siting trade-offs faced by public policymakers.
Rationale
The negative public reaction to large-scale technology-based projects seems to be tied to a more general sense that technological hazards are poorly understood even by facility operators; that large facilities are typically operated by impersonal and unapproachable management; and that a worst-case scenario for a large facility is substantially more disastrous than a worst-case scenario for a small facility of the same technology. Perrow (1984) , Wilbanks (1986) , and others have articulated a variety of reasons why scale intensifies public opposition. First, large-scale operations are less familiar both to operators and to the public-at-large in that they typically represent a scaling-up of a technology whose earlier applications were at a more modest scale. This, for example, is the case of nuclear power plants and resourcerecovery facilities. In the public eye, such operations tend to be at or beyond the outer edge of mainstream practice, designed and operated without a full understanding of the complexities attendant to large scale operations.
Second, risks of large facilities are generally seen as less controllable once a malfunction occurs. Public perception translates bigness into complexity and complexity into danger, whereas smallness represents simplicity and controllability.
Third, catstrophes are more likely in the operation of large facilities. When a malfunction occurs, the web of operational and support systems prevents easy identification and remediation of systems failures. Public anxiety towards events which have a low probability-of-occurrence, but a high hazard distorts their perception of aggregate risk. For smaller scale facilities, public perception of risk involves a spectrum of alternative consequences; for larger scale facilities, public perception involves only two possible consequences-either the catastrophic event occurs or it does not. This orientation toward extreme consequences (Popper, 1983 ) is tied to an inclination to simplify and magnify what is seen in the mass media and to rely on readily available information as a basis for assessing risks (Fischhoff, 1985) .
Fourth, the likelihood of public participation in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of facilities, and, thus, their ability to influence the way these facilities operate, is inversely related to scale. Large facilities require sophisticated technical judgments to manage the complexity of linkages between materials, labor, and capital in their design, construction, and operation. Such complexity fosters a sense of confusion and impotence in the public mind, and an inclination to oppose a project in total rather than focus on specific objectionable aspects.
Last, locational conflicts during the last two decades suggest that bigness provokes an ideological response. A large radioactive waste repository is a symbol of nuclear power and nuclear weapons and is likely to stir negative public emotions. This response contrasts strikingly to current response to on-site storage by thousands of dispersed radioactive waste generators. Similarly, a large hazardous waste treatment facility is a symbol of the 'chemicalization' of society and industry's introduction of new compounds at rates which defy proper testing and regulation prior to commercialization. This type of response, Wilbanks (1986) notes, derives from an association between large-scale facilities and broader agendas such as soft versus hard energy paths and chemical versus organic farming techniques. The result is the introduction of these agendas into siting procedures, despite the often tenuous link between a proposed facility and the achievement of some societal objective. For all these reasons-familiarity, controllability, susceptibility to catastrophe, approachability, and ideology-scale per se acts as an independent variable in fueling locational conflicts.
A related outcome of using large-scale facilities to meet regional requirements is that they tend to concentrate risks, whereas smaller dispersed facilities providing the same aggregate capacity spread risks across multiple locations. Many state agencies, for example, routinely confront this issue in preparing management strategies for disposal of chemical or radioactive wastes generated within their boundaries. Should one centralized, a few regional, or many dispersed facilities be operated? The tendency to date, and in our view an underlying impetus to siting conflicts, is to choose the first option. Locating one central facility, to some extent, may violate three principles of an equitable location policy: burden -benefit concordance, risk sharing, and informed consent (Kasperson, 1983; 1986a) . Since benefits from such facilities are more dispersed than burdens, spatial dispersion will tend to enhance burden-benefit concordance, the first principle. Since facility dispersion spreads risk over larger numbers of communities, risk sharing also is enhanced. Because informed consent is more likely where participation is maximized and information is accessible and comprehensible, the third equity principle also is served by dispersed smaller scale facilities.
To summarize, we argue that two fundamental determinants of opposition to large-scale noxious facilities derive from (1) the public perception that large facilities are disproportionately risky, and (2) the fact that such facilities reoresent a violation of equity by concentrating risks among the few and absolving others of their fair share. In our view, the inclination of regulators and developers to opt for largescale centralized facilities does not contradict the validity of the arguments made above, but rather illuminates the unequal bargaining strengths of the stakeholders in such projects and the recency of public anxiety towards such projects. The siting stalemates since the early 1980s suggest that traditional perspectives and procedures are no longer adequate to resolve the conflicts which characterize contemporary siting processes. Thus, a prescriptive location model that simultaneously addresses these two issues will begin to provide a tool for expediting the location of facilities in such a way as to address both equity and efficiency objectives. At the same time, the public opposition which has often prevented the siting of facilities will be reduced. We develop such a model structure in the next section.
Model formulation
A number of prescriptive location models have been developed and used to assist planners in locating facilities that pose a risk to nearby populations. These models generally tend to maximize some measure of the distance of populations to facilities or the distance between facilities. Although they share the common assumption that farther is 'better', they have been developed and used to address a variety of decision problems relating to the location of noxious facilities. We summarize some of the relevant model formulations below. [Moon and Chaudhry (1984) provide a review of many of these types of models.]
The /?-median model (Hakimi, 1964; 1965) was developed to address the problem of locating a given number of facilities (p) on a network to minimize the weighted average travel distance of populations to their closest facility. For locating 'noxious' facilities, the sense of the objective function is changed to maximizing the weighted sum of the travel distances of populations to their closest facility, called the p-maxian problem (Church and Garfinkel, 1978) . The p-defense model (Moon, 1977 ) is used to find the locational pattern that will maximize the average distance between facilities. A related issue, the p-dispersion problem, concerns itself with finding the location pattern that maximizes the minimum distance between any two of the p facilities (Shier, 1977) . These are applied in situations for which the spatial interaction between facility locations is important, that is, when activities at one facility affect activities at the other. [See Kuby (1987) for mathematical programming formulations of this problem.] Maximizing the distance of populations from facilities has also been formulated for various distance metrics (Drezner and Wesolowsky, 1983) and for different shaped regions (Melachrinoudis and Cullinane, 1986) .
Minimax criteria are used in 'center' location problems when the extreme rather than the average performance of the system of facilities is important, for example, in finding the locational pattern for p facilities that minimizes the maximum distance of any population to its closest facility (the p-center problem). Anticenter model formulations reverse this criterion, that is, the objective is to maximize the minimum distance of populations to facilities. These types of formulations have been applied to locating nuclear power plants (Cohon et al, 1979) .
Another frequently used criterion for locating service facilities involves ensuring the accessibility of populations to service facilities such as libraries, schools, or hospitals, or of services to populations, such as fire stations (Shilling et al, 1980) , emergency medical services (Daskin, 1982) , or combined vehicle and facility siting (Shilling et al, 1979) . In such cases the facility is said to 'cover' a given population if the population is within a prespecified distance or response time of the facility. The location set covering model is used to find the minimum number of facilities that will guarantee that all population in an area is 'covered' (ReVelle and Swain, 1970) .
If the number of facilities is specified exogenously (/?), a related formulation, the maximal covering location model (Church and ReVelle, 1974) , is used to find the maximum population that can be covered by the p facilities. Arc covering models (Current et al, 1984; 1985) are applied to finding the set of arcs (or paths in the network) that maximize the number of people who are within a given distance of any of those arcs.
When dealing with noxious facilities the inverse of 'cover' is 'anticover', the criterion that is used to find the locations of p facilities that will minimize the total population covered. Current et al (1986) have applied the anticover concept to finding paths through networks that cover the minimum number of people within a given distance of any arc in the path.
In this paper we propose a new normative criterion for the location of noxious facilities called 'complementary anticover' (CAC). The purpose of this formulation is to add to these existing location-model structures the two concepts described in the previous sections: (1) equity-as a function of the number of facilities that are sited, and (2) perceived risk-as manifested in public opposition related to the scale of the facility. To address equity and scale opposition, we have developed a multiobjective prescriptive modeling framework using CAC, and have applied it to a sample problem. The CAC model is designed to find spatial patterns that minimize the opposition to siting caused by equity and scale objections, and is based upon the following assumptions:
(1) The intensity of a local population's opposition to locating a noxious facility, based on perception of fairness or equity, tends to decrease as the number of other areas that host a similar facility increases, as long as these other facilities are distant enough to not place that local population at risk.
(2) The intensity of opposition to the siting of noxious facilities increases with the scale of the facility. Perceived risk is considered a function of the real risk and a scale-related factor-the larger the facility the greater the excess of perceived risk over real risk.
We have devised a risk-sharing measure which we call the equity outcome index to quantify the fairness issue. Figure 1 shows a hypothetical example of the trade-offs among cost, scale, and equity. As the number of facilities increases from 2 to 10, two outcomes occur. First, according to our assumptions, opposition per facility diminishes as (a) perceptions of risk due to scale are reduced, and (b) local populations are comforted in knowing that other communities are shouldering equal burdens. Second, cost per unit capacity increases, reflecting the loss of economies of scale. Thus, under these assumptions, the location-decision problem becomes one of finding a system of facility sizes and sites that will maximize equity outcomes and minimize local opposition to siting facilities within an acceptable range of cost per unit of service or product.
Three locational objectives are analyzed with the model structure: minimizing the total cost of meeting a prespecified regional demand, minimizing aggregate opposition related to scale, and maximizing the minimum equity index for any site that is to host a facility. The multiobjective formulation described below is intended to provide an explicit measure of these trade-offs. Since we are simultaneously optimizing three objectives, optimal solutions are represented by the set of nondominated or noninferior solutions to the multiobjective formulation. A solution is noninferior or nondominated if there does not exist another solution that is as good a solution for all objective functions and strictly better for at least one of the objective functions. The CAC model is presented in mathematical form below:
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JM K where = j 1, if facility size k locates at site /, •"* I 0, otherwise, /, j are indices of potential facility sites, i, j £ I (for this example and for simplicity, we have assumed that all sites are potential facility sites), k is an index of facility sizes, c k is the per-period cost for a facility of size k, a k is the capacity of a facility size k, D is the required total capacity for the region, o k is the scale opposition factor for a facility size k, d ik is the distance from a facility size k at site i beyond which risks are considered acceptable, that is, the effective risk radius of facility size k at i, d { j is the distance from site / to site /, Pj is the population at site j, N ik is the anticover set for facility size k at site y, Equation (1), objective g^F), is a measure of the total facility cost for meeting an exogenously specified regional capacity requirement. The locational decision variable, y ilc , will either have a value of 1 if a facility size k is to be built at site i (the facility size k is said to be 'opened' at site /), or will have a value of 0 if not. The cost associated with this facility, given by q, will be calculated only when a facility of size k is chosen to be built; the total cost for meeting capacity is the sum of the costs associated with all the open facilities. Objective g x {Y) is minimized in the composite objective function G(F).
The constraint inequality (4) assures that the capacity requirement is met. The (0, 1) location decision variable y ik is multiplied by a k , the capacity of a facility size k, and summed over all sizes k and all potential sites /.
The opposition due to the scale of a facility, o k , is assumed here to be a direct function of the total number of people considered at risk and a scale-related factor that increases as the facility size increases. At this juncture we simply translate our earlier analysis of the risk-perception literature into an increasing scale-opposition factor. We realize that future quantification of this parameter will require extensions of these psychological investigations, as well as models of collective action in the face of external threats to community well-being. Even without this extension, incorporating a scale-opposition factor in the model formulation at this time will permit testing of the sensitivity of solutions to different values of o k .
The parameter d jk represents the distance from a facility of size k located at site j beyond which the affected populations do not feel that they are at risk. The term d jk is called the 'effective risk radius' for a facility size k at site y. For notational and expository simplicity we have not incorporated a distance-decay function for risk; therefore, populations inside the effective risk radius for a facility are considered equally exposed to hazards, whereas those outside are not. This is an assumption that is often made for 'covering' locational models. However, this assumption can also be relaxed, allowing for measures of risk to decline with distance.
[See Church and Roberts (1983) for a method of incorporating different distancerelated cover measures.] For the CAC model, the population centers that would be at risk from a facility of size k that locates at a particular site / is given by the set M ik , the risk cover set, which is comprised of those sites that are within the effective risk radius of a facility size k located at site /. Equation (2) measures the aggregate scale opposition for a given location pattern by summing the product of the scale-opposition factor, o k , and the population of the towns in M ik . Objective g 2 (F) is minimized in the composite objective function.
Measuring the risks posed by noxious facilities to proximate populations is a complex undertaking that requires specific site-by-site evaluation to measure the pathways, event probabilities, and consequences of air and water residuals (White and Ratick, 1986) . For hazardous waste treatment facilities, for example, risk assessment generally combines air dispersion, hydrologic and chemical fate models, and transport-systems analysis to estimate aggregate risks of alternative sites under normal and extreme case conditions. In this case, the risk radius will depend upon the technologies utilized (for example, incineration versus land burial), microclimatic and geohydrological conditions, and the nature and volume of the wastes handled.
Our d jk combines these conventional measurements with the scale-related factors that can also enlarge the risk contours with increasing facility scale. It is possible to include other more complex risk and scale-opposition relationships within the CAC framework, since the values for the parameter o k , and the composition of the risk cover set M ik are developed exogenously to the model. So that the model formulation is not overly complicated we have restricted our discussion to an effective risk radius for each facility size, and to a single scalar multiplier to represent the scale-opposition factor.
A population may be within the effective risk radius of a number of facilities and, therefore, exposed to the risks from each. Under the assumption of additivity (versus synergism), the risk cover calculated for the objective function given in equation (2) will count a population each time it is within the effective risk radius of a facility.
The equity outcome index, E h is defined by the constraints represented in equation (5) (the meaning of E t is explained in greater detail below and in the example). These constraints ensure that E t will have the following properties. (a) If, in a model solution, a facility is chosen to be opened at site /, then the associated equity outcome index for site i, E n is the sum of the number of other sites j that are also chosen to have a facility and which do not include site i within their effective risk radii. (b) If, in the solution, site i is not chosen to have a facility, then we do not count E t .
If a facility is to be located at site i, that is, £#* = 1, M will be multiplied by 0, k thus the first term in equation (5) . If no facility is to be located at site i, then £)/ lVk = 0, and M will be multiplied by 1, setting E ( equal to a large number. The constraints represented by inequality (6) restrict E to be less than or equal to each E i9 and objective function g 3 (F) maximizes E [it is multiplied by -1 in the composite objective function G(F) which is to be minimized]. In constraint (6), the value E will be equal to the smallest value of the E t for a given solution. The third objective, g 3 (F), tries to make E as large as possible, that is, the procedure maximizes the minimum value of E. This is accomplished by selecting for a set of facilities those locations whose smallest equity outcome measure (is) is made as large as possible.
The constraint inequalities (7) restrict each site to have only one facility. This is done to simplify the formulation, although additional formulations can be developed to allow multiple facilities at a site.
The noninferior solutions to the CAC formulation will represent the trade-offs among the objective functions g x (Y), g 2 {Y), and g 3 (Y) and will suggest region-wide location patterns for a system of noxious facilities that tend to minimize the cost of meeting the installed capacity requirement, minimize the total opposition due to scale, and maximize the minimum equity outcome measure.
Example
The following sample problem has been developed to demonstrate the features of the CAC formulation. In this example, ten towns (indexed by i) are potential sites for the location of noxious facilities which collectively must meet a predetermined capacity requirement. The spatial pattern for the towns is given in figure 2 , where towns are represented by the nodes numbered 1-10. The number in parentheses is the population of each of the towns and the area of the circle representing the town is proportional to the town population. We assume, for simplicity, that all population is concentrated at the nodes. Three facilities of different size are considered: the smallest, k = 1, has a capacity of 1000 units; the intermediate, k = 2, a capacity of 2000 units; and the largest, k = 3, a capacity of 4000 units. The attributes of these facilities are given in table 1. As the facilities become larger, the cost per unit of installed capacity decreases, reflecting economies of scale. However, the effective risk-radius distance increases as does the scaleopposition factor. To keep the example straightforward, we have considered the risk cover for each of the facilities to depend only upon the size of the facility and not on its location. At least 10000 units of capacity are required for the region represented by the ten towns. Table 2 (see over) shows the nodes that are potentially within the effective risk radius for each of the different size facilities and for each of the towns. The complement of the union of these sets, for a particular town i, is comprised of the nodes that make up the anticover set for different size facilities at town i, N ik . For example, facilities located at towns 5 and 10 would not put any other towns at risk, whereas a facility located at town 6 would put the populations of towns 7 and 8 at risk for any size facility, and town 4 at risk for only the largest. To illustrate this, figure 3 (see over) depicts the CAC concept for town 3. A small or medium sized facility locating at town 9 would count in the equity outcome index measure for town 3, since both would represent risk-sharing locations from the standpoint of the population in town 3. This is the 'anticover' aspect of our model formulation. However, a large facility locating at town 9 would not count since town 3 is within the effective risk radius of a k = 3 size facility that is sited at town 9. In this case, in contrast to small and medium sized facilities, town 3 is 'covered' by a large size facility. The CAC model applied to our example using the above data required twenty-five functional constraints and thirty integer variables. The model was solved as a multiobjective program using the constraint method with objectives gi(F) and g 3 (F) treated as constraints. (For a detailed description of this method see Cohon, 1978 .) The model was solved on an IBM 3090 computer using the standard IBM MPSX/MIP software. Each model solution was obtained within 2 s of cpu (central processor unit) time.
Although this example has been formulated as a demonstration of the concept, the size of the model is representative of the size of many real applications. Additionally, the size of the model increases in direct proportion to the number of potential sites and the number of facility types, as opposed to exponentially with the number of sites and types. Therefore, even larger problems should not be too difficult to solve in a reasonable time with existing solution software. ,7, 8 6, 7, 8 4, 6, 7, 8 6, 7, 8 6, 7, 8 4, 6, 7, 8 6, 7, 8 6, 7, 8 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 9 4,9 1,2, 10 10 10 3, 4, 8, 9 Table 3 presents the output for the multiobjective runs. As the number of sited facilities increases from four to nine, the equity outcome index, E, increases from 3 to 7. Total system-wide costs, aggregate risk cover, and total scale opposition also increase. For the solutions that represent siting from four to seven facilities, the equity outcome index, E, equals one less than the number of facilities, E = 3 through E = 6, respectively. The solution that represents nine facilities has a corresponding equity index of E = 7 because of mutual risk coverage of facilities. Total facility costs to meet the 10000 unit capacity range from $26.4 million to $33.1 million, an increment of 25%. The total population risk increases from 250 to 710 (710 exceeds the total population in the area because, for this location pattern, the populations of some towns are at risk from more than one facility). Aggregate scale opposition increases from 437.5 to 720. Each successive increase in the equity-outcome measure requires an increase in the number of facilities needed to meet capacity. This, in turn, decreases the average opposition due to scale, per facility, from 109.4 to 80.0, a decrease of 27%.
These trade-offs are presented in graphic form in figure 4 . Moving from an equity outcome index of E = 3 to E = 4 (siting four and five facilities, respectively) greatly decreases the average scale opposition per facility, from 109.4 to 88.5, a decrease of over 19%, while the related facility costs rise from $26.4 million to $28.8 million, an increase of 9%. Locating six and seven facilities yields small gains in the reduction of scale opposition per facility and relatively small increases in the cost per unit capacity. However, increasing the equity outcome index from 6 to 7 requires the substitution of two small and one medium facility for a large facility, a $3.1 million increase in system cost, and a slightly larger decrease (5.7 units) in the scale opposition per facility. Figure 5 shows the spatial location patterns associated with equity outcome measures of 4, 5, and 7, respectively. For E = 4 [ figure 5(a) ], a k = 1 facility locates at towns 1 and 9; a k = 2 facility is located at 3 and 6; and a large, k = 3, facility is located at town 5. None of the host towns include the other towns where facilities are to be opened within the effective risk radius of their faciUties. Therefore, they each count towards the others' equity-outcome index, E = 4. The addition of another k = 1 facility at town 4, and the scale down of a facility at 3 from k = 2 to k = 1, achieves an equity-outcome index of 5 [ figure 5(b) ] but increases the total population at risk by 100, the population of town 4. Aggregate opposition thus increases through this additional population coverage; however, the average opposition per facility decreases because of the decline in average facility scale. The spatial pattern in figure 5(c) represents an equity outcome index of 7, the largest index value possible for our example. A facility is opened at each of the towns except for town 7. Of the nine open facilities eight are type k = 1 and one is type k = 2. The measure of the total population within the effective risk radius of these facilities increases to 710 including multiple risk exposures. Nine facilities are needed, since the facilities located at towns 2 and 3 put each of these towns at mutual risk. This is also true for the facilities at sites 6 and 8. The location pattern in figure 5(c) represents the largest increase in costs per unit increase in equity-outcome index, rising from $30 million to $33.1 million, an increase of over 10%. The associated measure of scale opposition per facility decreases from 85.7 to 80 or 9.33%, slightly less than half the reduction obtained by going from E = 3 to E = 4 (table 3 and figure 4).
Conclusions
We have presented a prescriptive model for locating a system of noxious facilities that explicitly accounts for the public opposition and equity consequences of alternative locational patterns. Our model structure was inspired by the persistent conflicts that surround the siting of noxious facilities such as hazardous waste storage, treatment, and disposal facilities; chemical plants; radioactive waste repositories; and other technology-based facilities which precipitate negative public response. We identified scale and risk sharing as two major underlying forces that intensify opposition and suggest that locational patterns which address both equity and efficiency criteria are possible once decisionmakers recognize these fundamental causes of locational conflicts. The output of the CAC formulation-by illuminating the trade-offs inherent in the choice of facility sites and sizes capable of meeting regional capacity requirements-can help to identify locational choices which increase the likelihood of public acceptance.
Our model formulation allows for the incorporation of more realistic physical and economic conditions which may impinge upon these locational choices. For example, assumptions about the values for, and configurations of, the risk contours associated with specific sites can readily be captured within the model framework to reflect the nature of the proposed facility (for example, chemical waste incinerators, resource recovery plants, radioactive waste repositories) as well as the physical conditions surrounding a specific site (for example, proximity to groundwater recharge zones, prevailing wind patterns, soil conditions). In addition, land and settlement patterns in the form of population densities, daily movement patterns, and other characteristics which affect aggregate risk may be incorporated. With regard to costs, technology-specific capital and operating costs may be utilized. For example, the losses of economies of scale as a result of the down-scaling and dispersing of facilities may not be as severe as the example problem suggests. Locating the increased number of facilities in an economically rational manner may enhance cost savings associated with transportation and accessibility by placing facilities closer to markets or sources of material inputs. The degree to which distance and location can overcome the losses due to economies of scale also are dependent upon the specific technologies and cost structures. Furthermore, dispersion may also have transport risk implications which will depend upon the change in total transport distances and the associated risks and efficiencies of smaller transport modes and additional transshipments.
These and other assumptions that relax the simple isotropic conditions and technological and economic uniformity promise a more accurate simulation of the real-world conditions underlying locational conflicts and, as such, will enhance the prescriptive strength of the complementary anticover model formulation.
